The Gauteng High Court in Pretoria dismissed Home Affairs Minister Aaron Motsoaledi’s application for leave to appeal its Zimbabwe Exempt Permit (ZEP) ruling, reports News24.
The court ruled in June that Motsoaledi’s failure to consult with ZEP holders, interested NGOs and the public was “unlawful, unconstitutional, and invalid”.
The court dismissed his application with costs.
The Gauteng High Court in Pretoria has dismissed Home Affairs Minister Aaron Motsoaledi’s application for leave to appeal against a ruling on his decision to terminate ZEPs.
The court ruled in June that Motsoaledi’s failure to consult with ZEP holders, interested NGOs and the public was “unlawful, unconstitutional, and invalid”.
At the time, the court extended the permits for 12 months from 28 June, pending the conclusion of a “fair process” that includes an adequate public participation process the court found had not been done before the 7 June gazette for the ZEP termination.
The court ordered that ZEP holders must be allowed to leave or enter South Africa and may not be dealt with in terms of sections 29, 30 and 32 of the Immigration Act on the basis that they are ZEP holders.
News24 previously reported that the minister applied for leave to appeal against the judgments, which he said set “dangerous precedents”.
The department said those were the findings of the court on the applicability of certain sections of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), which the Department of Home Affairs said was “highly questionable, particularly the requirement for public participation when a decision of this nature is taken, affecting a specified category of persons only.
In this instance, the affected Zimbabwean nationals.”
Motsoaledi also appealed because he believed the matter dealt with the separation of powers, to which the court ruled his grounds for application for leave to appeal were flawed.
In its judgment on Monday, the High Court said Motsoaledi’s application was “destined for failure” because he did not depose an answering affidavit in the review proceedings.
“Only the minister, as the decision maker, could give evidence as to what passed through his mind and how his mind was exercised,” the judgment read.
“The rest of the minister’s grounds for leave to appeal are not necessary to traverse.
It is enough to conclude by pointing out that the court was at pains to explain that its order under Section 8 (1)(e) of PAJA was temporary relief, which is distinct from a substitution order under section (8)(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of PAJA and is just and equitable remedy in terms of Section 172 (1)(b) of the Constitution.”
The court dismissed the minister’s application with costs.
